The Potential Impact of Antiwar Ballot Measures on the Election  

This campaign’s purposes do not include endorsing candidates. There are three main reasons for this. First, if there is any chance for Congress to support withdrawal funding in 2008 or to support a referendum in Iraq, it will be because of the ballot measures, and passage of those bills will require Republican support. Second, there are quite a few states and cities and counties where Republican support will be needed to put measures on the ballot. If the Iraqi people are going to be able to vote on this war and the American people are going to vote on this war everywhere it is possible to do so, which is the principal objective of this campaign, we cannot afford to alienate the votes of Republicans by endorsing their opponents. Third, because of the poll that showed two-thirds of Republicans effectively would support an Iraqi request for withdrawal, we cannot afford to alienate that potential support of a vital part of the campaign--the Iraq referendum. Nonetheless, the antiwar ballot measures and the referendum in Iraq can have a major impact in electing pro-peace candidates, most of whom will be Democrats. Although this is not a politically partisan campaign, one of the campaign’s goals, indirectly, is to elect pro-peace candidates. And the impact of the campaign in that regard will not be confined to those states or city or county ballots in which it is voted on--candidates elsewhere also will be asked to state their position on what the ballot measure calls for, the more so the more widespread the measures are.
	Here’s why ballot measures are important. The existing peace movement strategy is to endorse and work for pro-peace candidates and to work to defeat pro-war candidates. In a competitive race, however, there will be many organizations attempting to elect or defeat particular candidates, and peace organizations will be one voice among many such groups, with a corresponding slice of influence. In contrast, this campaign strategy will help create the peace movement as an independent force. From the perspective of simply electing candidates, it’s the best way for the peace movement to use its resources. Although Iraq is the number-two issue for voters, John McCain will try to make it the number-one issue, and thus it could become the tipping point in the presidential race and in close congressional races, when Republicans will be forced to choose whether they stand with McCain or with the majority of voters. In terms of having influence in the new Congress and with the new president, if the ballot measure campaign is seen as making a crucial difference in the presidential election and in many congressional elections, that will lead to increased visibility for peace movement issues and to increased access with lawmakers, in a way that becoming one more of the constituencies working for the election or defeat of candidates does not. And in terms of building a movement, this is the best use of resources. There is another limitation to supporting candidates in the absence of antiwar ballot measures. A candidate’s position on Iraq easily can be obscured by other factors. In the New Hampshire primary, for example, Republican voters who were most against the Iraq War gave their greatest share of support to John McCain, who had the strongest pro-war stand among major Republican candidates, and Democrats who were most opposed to the war favored Hillary Clinton, who had the weakest withdrawal position among the Democratic candidates. People vote for candidates based on a variety of reasons, and without an independent vote on the issue itself, made possible by a ballot measure, the candidate’s position can easily be obscured, by the candidate and/or the media. The ballot measures will make clear where the presidential and congressional candidates stand on the Iraq War and on withdrawal, enabling voters to vote for what they believe in, not what they believe the candidates stand for.   

Potential Effects on the Presidential Campaign 
Although the Iraq War is, and is likely to remain, the number-two issue in this election after the economy, that may understate its effect on the outcome of the presidential race and of key congressional races. This is particularly true with John McCain as the Republican and if  there are widespread ballot measures on the war. These factors can make the Iraq War, if not the number-one issue in the November election, then the central issue in deciding the outcome of the presidential race and many congressional races. McCain will make victory in Iraq (aka support for the surge and a long-term occupation of Iraq) a central issue in his campaign, maybe the central issue. Democrats, who have tried to make Iraq a secondary issue to the economy and health care, will not have the luxury of doing so. The ballot measures can strengthen the contrast between the Republican and Democratic nominees--as well as the spine of the Democrats--and, if they are widespread, have the potential to influence more than 60 percent of both the key Senate races and the key House races. 
The Iraq War and support for withdrawal already have been a major factor in influencing who the Democratic nominee will be, in increasing support for Obama and depressing support for Clinton. The peace movement has helped make opposition to the war and support for withdrawal a majority position, among Democrats and among independents. If cities pass resolutions supporting ballot measures or bills are filed by legislators in many states, they might influence the results of some of the remaining primaries. The candidate who endorses the antiwar ballot measure or the referendum first may gain some small edge. The chances that Obama or Clinton will be encouraged to take a better position on the war--which is how the peace movement can be most influential in affecting a candidate’s support--are slim in the absence of ballot measures. In any case, the ballot measures are an insurance policy, no matter who the Democratic nominee is, that he or she will have a better position on the war than presently. Although Obama would be better on withdrawal of U.S. troops and on the war on terror generally, neither he nor Clinton has made a firm commitment to withdraw all U.S. troops, and certainly not within one year. Even if Obama did endorse a one-year withdrawal, the ballot measures here and the referendum in Iraq would still be necessary to bind him to that commitment and to build the political power of the peace movement, which is the only way to make sure that commitment is honored. The peace movement probably can have a greater effect in the general election than the primary election at this point, because, arguably, the Iraq War has had as much impact as it is going to have.
Aside from improving the position of the Democratic nominee (and of congressional candidates as well) on withdrawal from Iraq, the main impact of antiwar ballot measures will be to help defeat John McCain. Because of them, McCain will not be able to ignore the issue of withdrawal, and if they are widespread, he will be forced to take a position yes or no on a measure supported by 50 percent of Americans. If measures are on the ballot in all the potential states, they will be on the ballot in states with 271 electoral votes, a majority. They will allow the Democratic presidential candidate to take a strong withdrawal position, distinguishing himself or herself from McCain, and turning what McCain now perceives as a strength into a weakness. The ballot measures will isolate McCain’s position on the war, turning it into a minority, and thus a losing, position. This is particularly important for independent voters. McCain has no chance of winning the presidency without independents, which form a large part of his support base. Independents broke for the Democratic Party in 2006 largely because of Democratic promises--still unfulfilled--to do something about the war. The ballot measures will encourage the Democratic candidates, presidential and congressional, to support a position on withdrawal that is supported by the majority of Americans, and certainly by the Democrats and independents needed to win. The ballot measures can solidify support for the Democratic nominee and reduce support for McCain among independents. This is particularly true for Obama, who will be able to cut into McCain’s independent base more effectively, but it is something even more needed by Clinton. Widespread ballot measures and support for a referendum in Iraq are the only way that there is a chance for congressional action on withdrawal before the election, which would further enhance Democrats’ chances.
	There are two ways in which candidates will be forced to take a position on the war and on withdrawal. The first is when there’s a measure is on the ballot in their state or congressional district, and the second is in Congress. Widespread ballot measure drives will help encourage the Democrats in Congress to not ignore withdrawal timelines but to put them to a vote; to oppose the Bush-Maliki agreement strongly; and to put support for a referendum in Iraq to a vote. This is particularly important in the Senate, where John McCain needs to be put on record on these and other positions on which his vote is likely to be unpopular. The same is true for other members of Congress. Here, though, the referendum may play a slightly different role. The concept behind the referendum--of abiding by the wishes of Iraqis if the majority supports a one-year withdrawal--is supported by two-thirds of Republicans and the great majority of independents and Democrats. In general, if Republicans (and conservative Democrats) are unable to bring themselves to support a one-year withdrawal, it’s likely that many of them can support a referendum. At least some Republican congressional candidates may see such support as a possible way out of impending defeat in November. Because Clinton and McCain (and maybe even Obama) cannot support a one-year withdrawal timeline for all U.S. troops, they will be under pressure to support the next best thing--a referendum in Iraq. Remember, a referendum in Iraq will eventually be the equivalent of, or lead to, a binding withdrawal timeline. Especially if polls show that the majority of Iraqis support it and the parliament passes it (and it is vetoed), the presidential candidates can’t say it’s a poor idea or that it doesn’t have support. McCain’s support for military victory in Iraq, for an open-ended occupation, will make it difficult for him to embrace the referendum. On the other hand, if there is widespread support for it, here and in Iraq, it may be hard for him to oppose it outright. He, like Clinton, might be agnostic, saying something like: “I’m neither going to support nor oppose a referendum. I’ll wait to see what happens, if it happens. I’ll take the vote into account if it does occur, but it’s not the only factor I will consider. I’m the commander in chief and I will decide this on military realities, on what the military says.” The rank and file in the military might support it, and even some of the officers. Bush will oppose a referendum, but the focus will be on McCain as the Republican nominee, not a lame duck Bush. Regarding McCain, the referendum is particularly important because it directly undercuts his support for the surge. The referendum will directly take on the purported success of the surge, which McCain will run on. It will accomplish the political goals that the surge ostensibly was designed to make possible, but has not, and it will do so while further decreasing the violence, especially that against U.S. troops. It will also take care of charges of “cutting and running” and being defeated by terrorists, through the Iraqi people taking responsibility for their own destiny and voting us out, rather than driving us out by violence, which would give a victory to the terrorists. It will redefine the meaning of victory. Calling for withdrawal without supporting the referendum is not sufficient to blunt the threat of McCain. Support for the referendum is essential.
	There is one final factor with regard to the presidential primaries, and that is the question of resources. Although the Democratic presidential race will continue into June, many of the organizational and staff resources devoted to the primaries and caucuses that already have been held will be available for other causes, such as convincing state legislatures in those states that have already voted to put an Iraq measure on the ballot. In particular, contact lists used for candidates could be used, if okayed. If, for example, the Obama campaign decides to give the antiwar movement access to its state organizational resources to get something on the ballot, this will be a big boost to the campaign--and a boost for his candidacy. This period is a window of opportunity to get antiwar measures onto the ballot, at precisely the time in which they need to do so, with the most critical months being April, May, and June (and into July in some places). The thousands of volunteers and scores of staff people released from the presidential campaigns could play a critical role in getting the signatures needed to place these measures on the ballot. This could also open up financial resources.

The Potential Contribution of Ballot Measures to Gaining Electoral Votes 
Twenty-seven potential ballot measure states and their contributions to electoral votes if all had statewide ballot measures: 258 electoral votes

New York, 31 
Illinois, 21
Pennsylvania, 21
Michigan, 17
North Carolina, 15
New Jersey, 15
Massachusetts, 12
Washington, 11
Tennessee, 11 
Maryland, 10
Wisconsin, 10
Minnesota, 10
Colorado, 9
Kentucky, 8
Oregon, 7
Connecticut, 7
Iowa, 7
Arkansas, 6 
New Mexico, 5
West Virginia, 5
Maine, 4
New Hampshire, 4
Hawaii, 4
Rhode Island, 4
Delaware, 3
Montana, 3
Vermont, 3 

Statewide Ballot Measures 
Because the twenty-seven potential statewide ballot measures will have to go through state legislatures--seventeen of which are outright or effectively controlled by Democrats--whether that potential is realized may come down to whether the Democratic Party understands that putting measures on the ballot is not only the democratic and most effective way to end this war but that it is also pragmatic politically. The widespread use of antiwar ballot measures could be a very important way to defeat John McCain. If the party’s legislators (and the Democratic governors) unite in those seventeen states in support of an antiwar measure, measures will go on the ballot in those states, helping Democratic candidates to win. If they do not, in some places there will be no measures on the ballot. If either Obama or Clinton embraces the ballot measure and/or the referendum in Iraq, this will enhance their chances of becoming the nominee; it will also enhance the chances of the getting measures on the ballot. Because of electoral vote considerations, Democratic legislatures in more conservative states, which might otherwise have been more reluctant to place measures on the ballot, will be under pressure to do so. A side effect of this, if it happens, is that most of the Democratic-controlled states may well put something on the ballot. There also will be national pressure on large states with a lot of electoral votes, such as New York and Illinois, to do so, and pressure as well on large states where only local measures are possible, such as California, Texas, Florida, and Ohio. The existence of budget crises in many states also will increase support for the ballot measures if the connection is made between war spending and the lack of funding for state budgets.
State legislatures might resist putting a one-year deadline on the ballot if either Clinton or Obama, or both, do not support it. There may also be reluctance or resistance to including the referendum as part of the ballot measure. The counterargument is that the ballot measure text is what the majority of the public, and especially the Democratic base, supports, and that the referendum strengthens its appeal. The important thing is to make the best case possible for both a one-year withdrawal and for the referendum, and then compromise if that’s what it takes to get something on the ballot. A withdrawal deadline of three to six months later is acceptable. Dropping the referendum from the ballot measure text is not preferable, but it’s acceptable. But, all the positive benefits of a referendum in Iraq should carefully be considered before dropping it as part of the package. 
Because neither Obama not Clinton so far supports a one-year withdrawal of all U.S. troops, some state legislatures may be reluctant to put a measure on the ballot whose provisions are not endorsed by the Democratic presidential candidates. If they decline to do so, however, they are ignoring the fact that the great majority of Democrats and the majority of independents support a one-year withdrawal, and that the populations of states with Democratic legislatures and a Democratic governor support withdrawal from Iraq by a greater margin than the national average. Or some legislators may seek to extend the deadline, to the end of 2009 or until a year after the new president takes office, say, by the end of January 2010. That’s okay, because as long as the deadline is reasonable, even if it’s not the one in the suggested text, the most important thing is to get something onto the ballot. The actual withdrawal deadline will be decided politically and will have to be negotiated with the Iraqis, in any event.
	There is one final aspect that will affect whether state legislatures put something on the ballot, and this is the budget crises in more than half of the states. The total budget shortfall has been estimated at about $40 billion, or about one-third of what is being spent on the Iraq War. If the money now spent on the war stayed with state and local governments instead or was used for federal aid to cash-strapped states, most, if not all, of the state budget crises could be resolved without major budget cuts. Making the link between the war and budget crises will put additional pressure on Republican legislators and others reluctant to place a measure on the ballot. It would do so through arguments such as, “You’re voting to cut all these programs while saying there’s no money and then rejecting a bill that would allow voters to have a say on ending the war, an act that could provide a large part of the funds needed to avoid cuts, if not this year then in years to come.” State fights on these issues can build awareness and arguments that we cannot both continue the war and fund universal health care, programs to address climate change, or all the other reforms that Democrats have promised. More broadly, linking the war and the economy is a winning approach--and one that will ensure that the Iraq War continues to be a central issue in the election.
 
The Potential Effect on Congressional Races
State and local ballot measures can have a decisive impact, by being the tipping point, in many congressional races, both in the House and the Senate. They will force the candidates to take a position on the issue of withdrawal, which, in the absence of a ballot measure, they might be able to avoid. Although Iraq will not be the only issue that voters evaluate a candidate on, it can be decisive for some voters. “Hot” ballot measures also increase voter turnout, by as much as 3 to 5 percent according to some studies, although that effect is less in races with “hot” candidate contests, such as this year’s presidential race, which will have a greater impact in bringing voters to the polls. 
When antiwar measures are placed on the ballot in key races with vulnerable Democratic incumbents, then those seats are safer. When measures are placed on the ballot in key races with vulnerable Republican incumbents or candidates, then those candidates are more vulnerable. In both instances, resources can be shifted to other key districts and the playing field can be expanded, bringing more potential gains. 
Key Senate races: There are thirteen competitive Senate contests. Ballot measures could have an impact in nine of those states. In six states, if the Democratic legislature and Democratic governor held together, they could put a measure on the ballot outright. In two states, it would take four to five Republic votes to put a measure on the ballot, and in one state (Alaska), a local measure in Anchorage would include 40 percent of the state population. Particularly in states in which Democratic candidates are behind, a ballot measure could have a major impact. (Even in races where the pro-peace candidate is ahead, ballot measures can help assure their election, thus freeing resources for candidates who are behind.) Antiwar ballot measures could be a major factor in adding Democrats to the Senate in seven states: Alaska, Colorado, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Oregon. 

Ballot Measure Possibilities in Key Senate Races

States where measures can be placed on the ballot by the Democratic-controlled state government:  
Colorado
Maine
New Hampshire
New Mexico
North Carolina
Oregon

States where it would take five or fewer Republican votes in the state legislature to put a measure on the ballot: 
Kentucky
Minnesota
 
States where city or county ballot measures could play a key role (local measures are allowed in all three states):
Alaska (Anchorage, with 40 percent of the state’s population, can be key)
Louisiana (New Orleans and Baton Rouge could be key)
Texas (key, if placed on the ballot in most major cities or large-population counties)

States where the role of city and county ballot measures is unclear or likely would play a minimal role:
Mississippi
Virginia

Key House races: We have conducted a Google search of the largest cities in the most competitive congressional districts for both Republicans and Democrats based on the districts  listed in the Cook Political Report for January 17, 2008 (by this point in this election season, that’s close to a final accounting of competitive races, although there have been a few Republican retirements since then that have created open, competitive seats). There are seventy-eight such races (a couple races not in the Cook Political Report have been added). In about a third of those races, there are large enough cities that, if a measure were on the ballot, it could have a major or decisive impact on the race. In another third, city ballot measures could have some impact on the race, and in the remaining third they would have no impact (many of these districts are suburban or rural, without a single major city). Two qualifications here: First, many of these congressional districts would not need to have local ballot measures if they were covered by statewide measures, as 58 percent could be. Second, we’ve looked only at ballot measure possibilities in cities, and not in counties, which could have an impact in almost all the districts in which city ballot measures would have little to no impact. Because it’s too late to get measures on ballots through citizen-petition initiative procedures, these measures would have to get on the ballot through lobbying city councils or county boards of supervisors. A caveat: this list is based on the assumption that ballot measures are allowed in these jurisdictions, which may not always be the case. In any event, we are making a case for ballot measure possibilities only; any specific possibility would require further research and confirmation.
Finally, city and county ballot measures need not be restricted to key congressional districts. In California, for example, the idea is to get measures on city and (especially) county ballots to reach as many people as possible, not restricted to the few congressional districts that have competitive races. Local ballot measures are a way to reach voters in places where statewide measures are not possible. The nuclear freeze initiatives in 1982 were on ballots in cities and counties as well as in states, and 20 percent of the population that voted on the freeze did so in local initiatives.

Ballot Measure Possibilities in Key Congressional Districts
Based on the Cook Political Report, House Rankings, January 17, 2008 
States with asterisks are ones in which only local, and not statewide, ballot measures are possible, and they include 33 districts, or 42 percent of all the districts  

* Alaska
At Large (Young, R): Anchorage, 40 percent 
Arizona
1 (Rick Renzi, open, R): Flagstaff, 9 percent
5 (Harry Mitchell, D): Scottsdale, 37 percent; Tempe, 26 percent 
8 (Gabrielle Giffords, D): none
* California
4 (John Doolittle, R): Roseville, 16 percent
11 (Jerry McNerney, D): Tracy, 12 percent; Pleasanton, 10 percent; Lodi, 9 percent; Manteca, 9 percent 
50 (Brian Bilbray, R): Escondido, 22 percent; Carlsbad, 14 percent 
Colorado
4 (Marilyn Musgrave, R): Fort Collins, 20 percent; Greeley, 13 percent; Longmont, 11 percent
Connecticut
2 (Joe Courtney, D): no large towns, but four counties
4 (Christopher Shays, R): Bridgeport, 22 percent; Stamford, 17 percent; Norwalk, 12 percent
5 (Chris Murphy, D): Danbury, 11 percent; New Britain, 10 percent  
* Florida
8 (Ric Keller, R): Orlando, 33 percent
13 (Vern Buchanan, R): Bradenton, 8 percent; Sarasota, 8 percent
15 (open, Curt Weldon, R): Palm Bay, 14 percent; Melbourne, 12 percent 
16 (Tim Mahoney, D): Port St. Lucie, 14 percent
24 (Tom Feeney, R): Port Orange, 8 percent
* Georgia
8 (Jim Marshall, D), Macon, 15 percent
12 (John Barrow, D): Augusta, 31 percent; Savannah, 21 percent
Illinois
6 (Peter Roskam, R): Mount Prospect, 9 percent; Wheaton, 8 percent
8 (Melissa Bean, D): Palatine, 10 percent; Schaumburg, 11 percent
10 (Mark Kirk, R): Waukegan, 14 percent; Arlington Heights, 12 percent
11 (open; Weller, R): Joliet, 16 percent
14 (open, Dennis Hastert, R): Aurora, 27 percent; Elgin, 15 percent 
18 (open, LaHood, R): Peoria, 17 percent; Springfield, 17 percent 
* Indiana
2 (Joe Donnelly, D): South Bend, 16 percent; Elkhart, 8 percent
7 (Julia Carson, D): Indianapolis (about 80 percent of the district?)
8 (Brad Ellsworth, D): Evansville, 20 percent; Terre Haute, 8 percent
9 (Baron Hill, D): Bloomington, 10 percent
* Kansas
2 (Nancy Boyda, D): Topeka, 17 percent; Manhattan (home of Kansas State University), 8 percent
3 (Dennis Moore, D): Kansas City, 22 percent
Kentucky
3 (John Yarmuth, D) Louisville, about 80 percent of the district
* Louisiana
6 (open, Baker, retiring): Baton Rouge, 35 percent
Michigan
7 (Tim Walberg, R): Lansing (unclear how much of it is in the district); Battle Creek, 8 percent 
9 (Joe Knollenberg, R): Farmington Hills, 13 percent; Troy, 12 percent; Rochester Hills, 10 percent; Pontiac, 10 percent; Royal Oak, 9 percent
Minnesota
1 (Tim Walz, D): Rochester, 15 percent
3 (open; Ramstad, R): Bloomington, 13 percent; Plymouth, 10 percent; Eden Prairie, 10 percent; Brooklyn Park, 10 percent; Edina, 8 percent; Maple Grove, 7 percent
6 (Michele Bachmann, R): St. Cloud, 11 percent; Woodbury, 7 percent; Blaine, 7 percent
* Mississippi
3 (open; Charles Pickering, R, retiring): district includes a portion of Jackson, population 176,00, portion in district unknown 
* Missouri
6 (Sam Graves, R): St. Joseph, 11 percent; Blue Springs, 8 percent
9 (Kenny Hulshof, R): Columbia, 15 percent
* Nevada
2 (Dean Heller, R): Reno, 27 percent; Carson City, 8 percent
3 (Jon Porter, R); Henderson, 40 percent
New Hampshire
1 (Carol Shea-Porter, D): Manchester, 18 percent
2 (Paul Hodes, D): Nashua, 14 percent
New Jersey 
3 (open; Saxton, R): Cherry Hill, 11 percent
7 (open, Ferguson, R): none 
New Mexico:
1 (open; Wilson, R): Albuquerque, 75 percent
2 (open; Steve Pearce, R): Las Cruces, 14 percent
New York:
13 (Vito Fossella, R): Staten Island, borough of New York City, 73 percent
19 (John Hall, D): none
20 (Kirsten Gillibrand, D): none
24 (Michael Arcuri, D): Rome, 9 percent
25 (Jim Walsh, R): Syracuse, 23 percent
26 (Tom Reynolds, R): none
29 (Randy Kuhl, R): none
North Carolina
8 (Robin Hayes, R): Includes parts of Charlotte, percentage unknown, and Fayetteville, percentage unknown; Concord, 8 percent; 
11 (Heath Shuler, D): Asheville, 11 percent
* Ohio
1 (Steve Chabot, R): Cincinnati, 50 percent; 
2 (Jean Schmidt, R): None
14 (Steve LaTourette, R): Mentor, 8 percent
15 (open; Pryce, R): district includes the downtown and western portions of Columbus, percentage of district unknown
16 (open; Regula, R): Canton, 11 percent
18 (Zach Space, D): Newark, 7 percent
Oregon
5 (open; Darlene Hooley, D, retiring): Salem, 23 percent
Pennsylvania
3 (Phil English, R):  Erie, 16 percent
4 (Jason Altmire, D): none, suburbs of Pittsburg
6 (Jim Gerlach, R): Reading, 12 percent
7 (Joe Sestak, D): none
8 (Patrick Murphy, D): none
10 (Chris Carney, D): none
18 (Tim Murphy, R): Mt. Lebanon, 6 percent; Bethel Park, 5 percent; Monroeville, 5 percent
* Texas
22 (Nick Lampson, D): Sugar land, 13 percent; Pearland, 13 percent; Missouri City, 10 percent
23 (Ciro Rodriguez, D): None
* Virginia 
2 (Thelma Drake, R): Virginia Beach, percentage unclear, but appears to be about 60 percent; Norfolk, 36 percent
11 (open; Davis, R): none
Washington
8 (Dave Reichert, R): Bellevue, 20 percent 
Wisconsin
8 (Steve Kagen, D): Green Bay, 15 percent; Appleton, 11 percent 

Top Thirty Ballot Measure Possibilities in Congressional Districts
(incumbent listed; some of these may be unnecessary if there are statewide ballot measures; ones with asterisks can only have local ballot measures, and they represent 15 districts, or half of the top local ballot measure possibilities)

Kentucky, 3rd District (John Yarmuth, D): Louisville, about 80 percent of the district
* Indiana, 7th District (Julia Carson, D): Indianapolis (about 80 percent of the district?)
New Mexico, 1st District (open; Heather Wilson, R): Albuquerque, 75 percent
* Virginia, 2nd District (Thelma Drake, R): Virginia Beach, percentage unclear, but appears to be about 60 percent; Norfolk, 36 percent 
* Ohio, 1st District (Steve Chabot, R): Cincinnati, 50 percent 
* Ohio, 15th District (open; Deborah Pryce, R): district includes the downtown and western portions of Columbus, percentage of district unknown
* Alaska, At Large (Young, R): Anchorage, 40 percent 
* Nevada, 3rd District (Jon Porter, R): Henderson, 40 percent
Arizona, 5th District (Harry Mitchell, D): Scottsdale, 37 percent; Tempe, 26 percent
* Louisiana, 6th District (open; Baker, R, retiring): Baton Rouge, 35 percent  
* Florida, 8th District (Ric Keller, R): Orlando, 33 percent
* Georgia, 12th District (John Barrow, D): Augusta, 31 percent; Savannah, 21 percent
Illinois, 14th District (open, Dennis Hastert, R): Aurora, 27 percent; Elgin, 15 percent 
* Nevada, 2nd District (Dean Heller, R): Reno, 27 percent 
New York, 25th District (Jim Walsh, R): Syracuse, 23 percent
Oregon, 5th District (open; Darlene Hooley, R, retiring): Salem, 23 percent
Connecticut, 4th District (Christopher Shays, R): Bridgeport, 22 percent; Stamford, 17 percent; Norwalk, 12 percent
* California, 50th District (Brian Bilbray, R): Escondido, 22 percent; Carlsbad, 14 percent 
* Kansas, 3rd District (Dennis Moore, D): Kansas City, 22 percent
* Indiana, 8th District (Brad Ellsworth, D): Evansville, 20 percent
Washington, 8th District (Dave Reichert, R): Bellevue, 20 percent
Colorado, 4th District (Marilyn Musgrave, R): Fort Collins, 20 percent; Greeley, 13 percent; Longmont, 11 percent
Michigan, 7th District (Tim Walberg, R): Lansing (unclear how much of it is in the district); Battle Creek, 8 percent 
Illinois, 18th District (open, LaHood, R): Peoria, 17 percent; Springfield, 17 percent 
New Hampshire, 1st District (Carol Shea-Porter, D): Manchester, 18 percent
* Texas, 22nd District (Nick Lampson, D): Waco, 18 percent
Pennsylvania, 3rd District (Phil English, R): Erie, 16 percent
Pennsylvania, 15th District (Charlie Dent, R): Allentown, 16 percent; Bethlehem, 11 percent
* California, 4th District (John Doolittle, R): Roseville, 16 percent
Wisconsin, 8th District (Steve Kagen, D): Green Bay, 15 percent; Appleton, 11 percent

Potential Effects of Ballot Measures on Congressional Votes
There is a final effect of campaigns to put antiwar measures on the ballot, and that is on congressional votes. The threat of such measures can change congressional votes on the war, not with a new Congress in 2009, but today, in 2008. The most competitive districts are, almost by definition, those districts where there are likely to be swing votes in Congress, both Democrat and Republican. (They don’t cover the full range of swing votes, however, including the two-thirds of senators who are not up for reelection and conservative Democrats who are in safe seats.) Nonetheless, a large number of swing votes on the war can be affected by ballot measures. Because this is a grassroots campaign, it’s hard to predict where there will be drives to put measures on the ballot. Therefore, any particular sitting member of Congress cannot be sure that an antiwar measure will, or will not, be on the ballot in their state or congressional district. It’s well known that the threat of an initiative can sometimes be as effective in changing votes as an actual ballot measure. And this is not only true of candidates. Some senators who are not up for reelection may be encouraged to change their votes on war funding and other issues if the campaign, and the increased support for withdrawal and for a referendum in Iraq that it creates, leads to a national shift in public opinion or to a shift in their state where a ballot measure drive is under way. It may also encourage Congress to conduct the kinds of hearings on the war that it has so far failed to hold, hearings on the causes, coats, and consequences of the war, and on concrete planning for, and on the benefits of, withdrawal and a democratic, nonviolent, international end to the war.
	There is one final, but crucial, consideration with regard to the effect of ballot measures on congressional legislation. Even if you believe, realistically, that getting a measure on the ballot will be difficult, because of limited organizational resources or of expected resistance from elected officials, or both, it still will be worth trying in many instances. You can’t be sure you won’t succeed--and equally important, neither can your member of Congress, and thus they can’t be sure that supporting the war won’t come back to haunt them in November. Even if you don’t succeed in getting a measure on the ballot, you will have built connections and developed arguments that could help in defeating a pro-war member of Congress, or in electing a pro-peace member of Congress and a pro-peace president. At the very least, you will have expanded the reach and power of the antiwar and peace movements. The bottom line: Working to get an antiwar measure on the ballot is valuable for its own sake, no matter what the outcome is.